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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE RULE OF LAW* 
Paul G. Kauperf 
I SHOULD like to approach this afternoon's subject along two lines. On the one hand, I propose to develop the subject in terms of 
the Supreme Court's contribution to our understanding of the 
Rule of Law, and, on the other hand, I propose to look at the Su-
preme Court as a governmental institution subject to the Rule of 
Law. In short, I propose to discuss the Supreme Court both as an 
instrumentality for the development of the American concept of 
the Rule of Law and as an institution governed by the Rule of Law. 
Needless to say, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive 
since the framework of limitations and principles within which 
the Court operates necessarily determines its positive contribution 
to the Rule of Law in our constitutional order. 
I. The Supreme Court's Contribution to the Rule of Law 
Although attempts are made to universalize upon the Rule of 
Law concept and perhaps even determine its content by reference 
to a priori principles based upon the nature of the social order and 
the values it serves, these efforts result in no unanimous agreement, 
and I am inclined to think that any conclusions to be drawn re-
specting the nature of the Rule of Law find their greatest validity 
in empiric survey and analysis of the operations of a given societal 
system. Here in the United States we have not, on the whole, given 
a lot of thinking to the Rule of Law idea which Dicey developed 
at such length on the basis of his observations of the English system. 
We speak of "government under law," of a "government of laws 
and not of men," or some may even use the term "due process of 
law" to refer in a broad way to ideas that may otherwise find 
expression in the rule of law terminology. 
Nor has the Supreme Court, the central object of our discus-
sion, engaged in any extended discussion of Rule of Law as an 
abstract question. Its understanding and contribution is largely 
dependent upon the implications of the constitutional order in 
which it operates, its role and functioning as a judicial body in the 
interpretation of the Constitution, and the values which it stresses. 
• Lecture delivered on June 24, 1960, as part of a series of lectures on the general 
topic, "Post-War Thinking About the Rule of Law," given in connection with the Special 
Summer School for Lawyers held at The University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor~ 
June 20-July I, 1960.-Ed. 
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
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In the exercise of its authority, the Supreme Court functions in 
two principal respects. First, in the exercise of its power of judicial 
review, it assumes the authority and function of authoritative in-
terpretation of the Constitution viewed as a fundamental law. 
Secondly, it is the court of last resort in interpreting treaties and 
laws of the United States. In both capacities it occupies a strategic 
and pivotal rule in determining the empiric significance of the Rule 
of Law in the United States. Although the Court's role in constitu-
tional interpretation usually attracts the greater interest and will 
receive the major attention in the discussion that follows, it should 
be emphasized that the Court's function in the interpretation of 
statutes is no less important in evaluating the Court's contribution 
to the development of our constitutional order. As the English 
experience so well demonstrates, an independent judiciary can 
effectively protect basic rights and check abuses of executive and 
administrative power even though it does not presume to review 
the constitutionality of legislative acts. 
If, whatever else we may mean by it, the Rule of Law means 
the subjection of governmental authority to legal restraint, then a 
system like ours means the elevation of the Rule of Law concept to 
its highest level. Recourse to disinterested tribunals to protect the 
citizen's rights and to check abuses of authority by executive and 
administrative officers and agencies is a feature usually judged in-
dispensable to any concept of Rule of Law or of government under 
law. Indeed, I suppose that this is the most elementary meaning 
of due process of law, namely, that no person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty or property except in accordance with law and in ac-
cordance with the procedures established by law. But our system 
goes beyond this. Our Supreme Court, and here it symbolizes the 
entire judicial authority, assumes the function not only of deter-
mining whether officers of the government act within the limits of 
authority defined by law but the authority also to determine 
whether the law-making power has observed limits prescribed by 
the Constitution. 
It is because acts of both Congress and the state legislatures 
may be challenged before the Supreme Court to determine their 
constitutional validity, by reference either to the distribution of 
powers under the Constitution or by reference to basic rights safe-
:guarded by the Constitution, that the concept of the Rule of Law, 
.in the sense that governmental authority is itself subject to law, 
:assumes an extraordinarily large significance under our system. I 
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do not mean to suggest that a written constitution with a power in a 
supreme court to determine its final meaning, even to the extent of 
holding legislative acts invalid, is essential to any generalized con-
cept of the Rule of Law. Independent courts with authority to 
interpret and apply the law and freely available to the citizen by 
effective remedial devices are commonly regarded as indispensable 
in any meaningful understanding of the Rule of Law in constitu-
tional democracies. The power, however, to declare legislation 
invalid is not. Surely England furnishes us with a prime example 
of a country whose traditions and institutions give meaning to the 
rule of law idea. Yet no English court would assume to declare 
an Act of Parliament invalid by reference to the court's under-
standing of the English constitutional tradition. 
But judicial review, resting on the twin postulates that the 
Constitution is fundamental law and that under our separation of 
powers it is peculiarly the function of the judiciary to interpret the 
meaning of law, is a fundamental American institution that 
furnishes a basic starting point in giving meaning to the Rule of 
Law for us. 
The conception of the Constitution as fundamental law to be 
interpreted and vindicated by the judiciary deserves another word 
of emphasis. Much stress is placed in current discussions of the 
Rule of Law on the idea that law must rest on the will of people 
and that any meaningful concept of the Rule of Law presupposes 
the power of the people to determine basic policies of the govern-
ment by means of free and universal suffrage and the institutions 
of representative government. I do not mean to discuss the ques-
tion whether any universal concept of the Rule of Law presup-
poses a democratic society and the institutions for manifestation 
of the popular will. It is sufficient to note that while our constitu-
tional system presupposes a legislative power resting on the will 
of people as determined by the right of the people to elect their 
representatives and in turn to retire them from office, it does not 
accept the thesis of the uncontrolled power of the majority. On 
the contrary, the popular will, as it finds expression in the legisla-
tive power, is subject to the fundamental law. Or to put the matter 
in another way, the temporal will of the people is subject to the 
more enduring general will reflected in the fundamental law. 
We have, then, a system fortified by a ·written constitution and 
the exercise of judicial review, in which the Supreme Court oc-
cupies a pivotal role to the end that government in its totality is a 
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government under law. The system, therefore, is admirably 
adapted to provide the means for checking and assuring the legality 
of acts of government. To assure the integrity of this constitutional 
order is pre-eminently the task and role of the Supreme Court. 
It is in the discharge of this role that the Supreme Court by the 
decisional process makes its contribution to the Rule of Law in our 
constitutional order. Its work on the constitutional level extends 
primarily to three areas: the umpiring of the federal system in 
order to preserve the constitutional balance of authority between 
the federal and state governments; its further work in preserving 
the balance between the executive power and the legislative power; 
and its role as defender of fundamental human freedoms. Its con-
tribution to the Rule of Law is to be measured, however, not only 
by what it does to insure the legality of governmental acts, no 
matter in what division or on what level, but even more signifi-
cantly by its conscious or unconscious explication of the values 
that in the eyes of the Supreme Court give ultimate meaning to our 
whole constitutional structure and, indeed, to the whole social 
structure and the objectives served by it. For, as Professor Harvey 
pointed out in his opening lecture of this series, the concept of the 
Rule of Law stated wholly in terms of restraints on the illegal 
exercise of power may be sterile and meaningless. The ultimate 
significance of the Rule of Law must be found in some understand-
ing of the basic objectives served by the legal order and in turn the 
values treasured by our society. 
What, then, has been the Supreme Court's contribution to our 
constitutional order and to the formulation of values served by our 
system? 
I mentioned above the three principal areas in which it op-
erates on the constitutional level. I shall not say much about the 
Court's function in umpiring the federal system. It is enough to say 
that the Court has contributed effectively to keep the states within 
their jurisdictional limits by its interpretation both of the implicit 
limitations on state authority derived from the Constitution, 
notably the commerce clause, and the limitations derived expressly 
or impliedly from legislation of Congress. On the other hand, the 
Court, particularly in recent years, has not functioned so effectively 
in keeping the power of Congress within limits. Indeed, the Court 
has virtually abdicated its authority in determining the limits on 
the authority of Congress in the exercise of the commerce power, 
unless the legislation impinges upon specifically protected rights, 
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and Congress is virtually free to determine for itself the reach of 
its power under the commerce clause. To put the matter in 
another way, the principle of federalism, so far as the regulation of 
economic matters is concerned, has yielded in importance to what 
the Court regards as the necessity of a power in Congress adequate 
to deal with situations of national importance in a society where 
the expansion of basic activities across state lines, the heightened 
development of national consciousness, and an increased awareness 
of the federal government's responsibility for meeting basic na-
tional needs render irrelevant much earlier thinking as to the 
proper spheres of authority as between the nation and the states. 
Turning to the Court's role in preserving the balance between 
congressional power and Executive authority and in subjecting 
executive action to legal restraint, the recent years have witnessed 
an increased willingness and readiness of the Court to scrutinize 
the actions of the executive departments in the interest of vindicat-
ing the supremacy of law where basic rights are involved. Perhaps 
the most famous case of our generation bearing on this question 
is the steel seizure case.1 Whatever else they mean and reduced to 
their minimum content, the majority opinions establish the funda-
mental idea that when the President deals with a matter within the 
legislative competence of Congress, his authority is subject to the 
congressional power and any exercise in conflict with congressional 
policy is invalid. Opinions may differ on the question whether the 
Court correctly applied this principle in the case before it, but 
the basic principle that the Executive must act within the limits of 
law and the implication of the decision that in case of conflict the 
Court will throw its weight behind the law-making power has 
important and vital relevancy in appraising the Court's contribu-
tion to the Rule of Law. We may also consider in this connection 
the Court's decision in Cole v. Young,2 which held that the Presi-
dent had gone beyond statutory authority in extending the federal 
employee security program to persons not in sensitive positions. 
And finally, mention may be made of the passport cases3 where the 
Court held that Congress had not authorized the Secretary of State 
to deny passports on grounds related to the applicant's political 
associations. The Court's readiness in these cases and others that 
may be mentioned to examine the legality of executive action in 
1 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
2 351 U.S. 536 (1956). 
3 Kent and Briehl v. Dulles, 357 U.S. ll6 (1958); Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958). 
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contexts where at an earlier time the Court might have rested its 
case on a theory of executive prerogative or discretion mark an 
increasingly important contribution by the Court in maintaining 
the Rule of Law. 
Related to the foregoing are the recent significant decisions in 
which the Court has squarely relied on the Rule of Law idea to 
curb the exercise of executive power in areas of recognized discre-
tionary authority. I have in mind the decisions holding that when 
a department head makes rules for his department, even though 
he otherwise is vested by statute with discretionary authority over 
the subject matter, his rules become law and he is bound by them 
and cannot choose to disregard them in dealing with a specific 
case. A prime example is the Court's holding that the Secretary of 
State had improperly discharged an employee of the department 
since he had not followed the rules governing the procedure for 
this type of case.4 
The Supreme Court's most effective contribution, however, in 
recent years is found in its decisions dealing with basic rights of 
the individual, and if we are engaged in an empiric construction 
of the Rule of Law by reference to what the Supreme Court con-
siders important in our constitutional structure, then certainly the 
protection of fundamental human rights by law and by means of 
adequate remedial processes for access to courts becomes a key 
element in the whole picture. For it is in the choice of values that 
the Court considers important and the way in which it protects 
these values that we get perhaps the best picture of the kind of 
society which the Court within the limits of its powers is promot-
ing, and it is this conception of the kind of society and the values 
basic to it that point in the end to the significant objectives served 
by the Rule of Law. 
The Court has two starting points in the Constitution in deal-
ing with basic rights: first, the rights expressly protected as against 
the federal government and the states in the body of the Constitu-
tion and the Bill of Rights (the latter a limitation only on the 
federal government); secondly, the so-called fundamental rights 
which the Court has read into the interpretation of the due process 
clause. We know that at one stage in the Court's history, great 
emphasis was placed upon the protection of economic freedom, 
freedom of business enterprise and proprietary rights as funda-
mental rights in the interpretation of the due process clause. This 
4 Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957). 
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interpretation was derived from the Court's reliance upon a laissez-
faire economics as basic to our system. That day has passed, and it 
may safely be said that no particular type of economic system en-
joys constitutional sanction at present. Or, to put the matter 
another way, the decline of economic liberty as a fundamental 
facet of basic rights reflects the Court's thinking that the determina-
tion of economic policy is a matter reserved for determination by 
the people's law-making representatives.5 
On the other hand, the recent years have witnessed judicial 
emphasis upon a new set of constitutional rights, not new in the 
sense that they were previously unknown to the Constitution but 
new in the emphasis that the Court is placing upon them and new 
in the resolute exercise of judicial power to protect them. These 
basic rights fall into three categories: (1) procedural rights, parti-
cularly of those accused of crime; (2) the substantive freedoms of 
expression; and (3) the right to equal protection. 
There is not time to detail the way in which the Court has 
given new emphasis to these rights. But the general features of 
this development deserve mention. First of all, the basic proce-
dural rights stated in the Bill of Rights have received fresh 
treatment. The cases dealing with the privilege against self-
incrimination, 6 double-jeopardy,7 right of confrontation,8 and 
right to counsel9 are illustrative of what I mean. The decisions10 
holding invalid the statute and treaties authorizing trial abroad by 
courts-martial of non-military personnel charged with crime point 
to the Court's high regard for the right to trial by jury. Indeed, 
jury trial in all its phases, whether in criminal or civil cases, has 
probably been elevated to its highest point in our constitutional 
history. We may mention here also, although the cases did not 
rest on constitutional grounds, the recent decisions holding inad-
missible confessions obtained by federal officers while holding a 
prisoner in violation of the statutory requirement of prompt 
arraignment11 and the continued vitality of the rule of the Weeks 
5 See the Court's opinion in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron &: 
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949). 
6 See, e.g., Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955). 
7 See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). 
8 See Greene v. McEiroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). 
9 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
10 Reid v. Covert, Kinsella v. Krueger, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Kinsella v. United States 
ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); McEiroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 
U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960). 
11 See, e.g., Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). 
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case12 holding inadmissible evidence obtained by illegal search 
and seizure.13 
Similarly the Court has attached greater emphasis to the pro-
cedural significance of the due process clause as a limitation on the 
states. Freedom from illegal police methods in securing confes-
sions, 14 the right to counsel as an element of a fair hearing,1° and 
increasingly closer scrutiny of the fairness of trials16 all testify to 
the Court's concern for the observance of procedural regularity. 
In contrast to the decline of economic liberty as a fundamental 
right, the freedoms of the first amendment, including the freedom 
of religion, freedom of speech, press and assembly, and the cognate 
freedoms viewed as fundamental rights in the interpretation of the 
due process clause, have been elevated to the highest position in 
the values protected by the judiciary. The Court has characterized 
these freedoms as preferred freedoms in our society, and has shown 
a readiness to scrutinize more closely legislative and other govern-
mental acts impinging upon them.17 To be sure the Court is by 
no means unanimous in its decisions dealing with cases involving 
these issues. One part of the bench treats these freedoms as vir-
tually absolute, and another segment finds that these freedoms are 
subject to limitation in the exercise of legislative power to achieve 
appropriate public interests.18 But the vitality and importance 
of these rights in our system is recognized by all. 
Finally, the right to equal protection of the laws, or conversely, 
the freedom from discrimination, has been a major development 
of the recent years, culminating in the famous decision holding 
invalid the laws requiring racial segregation in public schools.19 
12Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
13 The Court has just recently extended the rule of the Weeks case in its holding 
that evidence obtained by state police officers by means of unconstitutional search and 
seizure may not be used in federal courts. Elkins and Clark v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 
(1960). 
14 See, e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 
(1959). 
15 For the most recent case, see Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960). 
16 See Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960), where the Court reversed 
a conviction on the ground that it was not supported by any evidence. The case suggests 
interesting implications on the use of the due process clause as a basis for reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence in state criminal prosecutions. 
17 For a history of the "preferred freedoms" concept as it has found expression in the 
Supreme Court's opinions and a discussion of the practical implications of this concept, 
see McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1182 (1959). 
18 See the majority and dissenting opinions in American Communications Ass'n v. 
Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Barenblatt v. 
United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
19 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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A series of follow-up per curiam decisions indicate that the Court 
regards all segregation legislation as invalid.20 Even though the 
Court has repeatedly said that classification is a matter for legisla-
tive discretion and that the rationality of classification will be pre-
sumed, the Court has made clear that classification by race or color 
is inherently irrational and will not be sanctioned. 
What, then, is the emerging pattern with respect to protection 
of basic rights, particularly as it bears on the Supreme Court's 
contribution to the rule of law. The pattern I think is quite 
definite. The heightened emphasis upon procedural regularity in 
the protection of the accused, upon freedom of expression in its 
various facets, and upon equal protection regardless of race or 
color, all indicate concern for the central values of a democratic 
society, namely, the worth and dignity of the individual and the 
opportunity for free expression of ideas and beliefs, both because 
free expression is vital to the development of the individual and 
because it is indispensable to the political freedom of our society. 
On the other hand, the determination of basic economic policy is 
a matter reserved for the people through their elected representa-
tives. What is important here is that the people's right to be 
heard on these matters and to have a voice in the decisions remains 
unimpaired. 
An enlarged conception of national powers adequate to meet 
human needs at a time when the positive responsibilities and duties 
of government are receiving new emphasis, increased scrutiny of 
executive power in the interest of maintaining its subordination 
to the law-making power, and broadened protection of procedural 
rights, the freedoms of expression, and the freedom from discrimi-
nation-these are the vital elements conspicuous in the current 
processes of constitutional adjudication. Together they constitute 
the picture of the kind of society the Supreme Court envisages 
under our Constitution and which furnishes the values basic to 
our Rule of Law. It is a free and open society premised on demo-
cratic principles, concerned with the supremacy of the law-making 
power over the executive, committed to the freedom and the 
dignity of the individual and his opportunity for development and 
expression, and at the same time, responsive to basic human needs. 
To some it may appear that the growing acceptance of the con-
cept of the welfare state intervening in increasing greater measure 
20 See, e.g., Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1956) 
(segregation at public bathing beach); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1956) 
(segregation at public golf course). 
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in the lives of its citizens and assuming greater direction for the 
control of their actions is antithetical to the basic idea of freedom 
and incompatible with the whole concept of the Rule of Law. It is 
true that if Rule of Law means nothing more than legal restraints 
upon the actions of government, our whole current development 
marks a move in the wrong direction so far as preservation of the 
Rule of Law is concerned. How far regulation by the government 
of the lives of its citizens can go without impairing the freedoms 
and values basic to a democratic society is, indeed, a critical and 
important question. If by the concept of the welfare state we 
mean that the state should assume the responsibility to act in a 
positive way to meet minimum basic human needs, to provide a 
floor in defining the standards essential to an existence compatible 
with human dignity and the conditions essential to man's develop-
ment as a physical, intellectual and moral creature, a program of en-
larged governmental activity may serve to protect and enlarge the 
freedoms we cherish. But the expansion of governmental services 
and the proliferation of the bureaucracy in regulating the people's 
affairs and dispensing public benefits make all the more imperative 
the observance of the freedoms that insure the citizen's liberty of 
person, his right to be free from arbitrary and unauthorized inter-
ference by officers of the executive and administrative departments, 
his right to equal treatment under the law, and his freedom to 
express himself and exercise a voice in the determination of the 
legislative policies that affect his well-being. 
2. The Supreme Court Under the Rule of Law 
As indicated at the beginning of this lecture, it is relevant to 
inquire not only respecting the Supreme Court's contribution to 
the Rule of Law but also to consider the question whether and in 
what ways the Supreme Court as an institution and as one of the 
arms of government is itself subject to restraints implicit in the 
Rule of Law concept. For if it is true that this is a government 
of laws and not of men, it is appropriate to inquire how the 
Supreme Court in the exercise of its power of review fits into this 
pattern. Charles Evans Hughes once said that the Constitution is 
what the judges say it is. This is true. And certainly the whole 
constitutional development of the past twenty-five years, with its 
marked changes in constitutional interpretation, indicates that the 
Court feels free to reconsider and to re-interpret the fundamental 
law in order to accommodate its changing insights and points of 
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emphasis with respect to the basic policies and values protected 
by the Constitution. 
If the power of interpretation is unrestricted, we are at the 
mercy of a judicial oligarchy, a situation no more compatible with 
democratic notions than rule by a dictator or by a triumvirate. We 
may all agree with Judge Learned Hand that if we have to choose 
between rule by "a bevy of Platonic Guardians," no matter how 
wise and well-intentioned, and rule by elected representatives of 
the people, we should choose the latter.21 
What, then, are the restraints on the judiciary to insure its ex-
ercise of its important powers in a manner commensurate with the 
basic premises of a democratic society? In his famous dissent in the 
Butler case22 Mr. Justice Stone told his colleagues that the only re-
straint on the Court's power was its own sense of self-restraint. There 
is much truth in this statement but it is not completely accurate. As 
Hamilton observed in the Federalist Papers the federal judiciary 
is the weakest branch of the government in that it lacks the re-
sources of physical power and money that give strength to other 
agencies of government.23 Congress can determine the size of the 
Supreme Court, the salaries of the judges, and even limit the 
Court's jurisdiction. The Court is in this sense dependent on 
Congress, just as it is dependent on the executive department when 
ultimate questions arise with respect to enforcement of the Court's 
decrees. An even more important control, however, is reflected 
in the Court's responsiveness to the forces of public opinion. 
Since the Court's formal position in the structure of constitutional 
power is a relatively weak one, its strength and independence de-
pend ultimately on its moral authority as measured by the public 
trust, respect and confidence generated by the Court's reputation 
for disinterestedness, integrity, and a sober sense of responsibility 
in the discharge of its important and delicate tasks. Like any other 
institution of government, the Court is subject to the corrective 
process of public judgment. Moreover, public opinion exerts an 
invisible influence in determining the policy and value norms, 
or, if you prefer, the prepossessions and predilections, that enter 
into the substance of the judgment process. Judges, by virtue of 
their education, training, and the development of their intellectual 
and emotional processes and responses, cannot divorce themselves 
21 HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958). 
22 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 {1936). 
23 No. 78. See Beard's edition, THE ENDURING FEDERALisr 332 (1948). 
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from the movement of ideas and events that shape contemporary 
political, social, and economic developments. It is true in this 
sense, as Dooley once observed, that the Supreme Court follows the 
election returns. 
Even though our history demonstrates that over a period of 
time, judicial sensitivity to public opinion, coupled with changes 
in Court personnel, will insure a flexibility of interpretation 
responsive to new conditions and new conceptions of the role of 
government in our society, it remains true that the insight, sense 
of responsibility, and disinterestedness that the Court brings to the 
discharge of its task at any given time are important to the nation. 
A reckless exercise of power by the Court may have damaging 
effects. We need to be reminded that the Supreme Court's inter-
vention in the slavery dispute in the Dred Scott case,24 with the 
mistaken thought that this great issue could be resolved by 
judicial decision, is now regarded by historians as a tragic event 
that fanned the flames of sectional controversy and hastened the 
further events that produced the Civil War. Likewise we may 
recall that the Court's one-time adamant position in restricting 
congressional power under the commerce clause, coupled with its 
concern for freedom of contract and of business enterprise as 
dominant values under the Constitution, precipitated the con-
stitutional crisis of the 1930's, when the Court was threatened with 
a deliberate court-packing proposal designed to bring it into line 
with new conceptions rooted in the realities of American political 
and economic life. Fortunately, the unfavorable response of Con-
gress and the public, together with the Court's own self-corrective 
action, resulted in rejection of this bold proposal which, if it had 
been adopted, would have struck a serious blow at the independ-
ence and integrity of the judiciary and established an ominous 
precedent. 
The point has been made that the Court in recent years has 
adapted constitutional interpretation to conceptions of policies and 
values it regards as vital to our democratic society. Federal powers 
have received broadened interpretation, and procedural rights, 
freedom from discrimination, and the first amendment freedoms 
have received greater emphasis whereas the judicial protection of 
economic liberty has been devitalized. In the course of this de-
velopment older cases have been overruled, and the principles 
established by them have been discarded. But to mention these 
24 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
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changes is to suggest at once the question whether the very con-
ception of the Constitution intended to endure for generations to 
come does not require a steadfastness in interpretation which pre-
cludes rejection and overruling of prior doctrines and principles 
which through the decisional process have become a part of the 
law of the land. 
Certainly it is true that stability in constitutional interpreta-
tion is important if the notion of a fundamental law is to serve its 
purpose, and if the Court is to preserve its role as a judicial tribunal 
which operates within the bounds of an inherited and controlling 
legal tradition and thereby itself acknowledges the Rule of Law. 
Fortunately the common-law method followed by the Supreme 
Court in the process of constitutional adjudication-a method 
characterized by respect for precedent and the further development 
of the law in the light of prior decisions - does in itself operate as a 
powerful restraint upon judicial subjectivity and individualism 
and thereby contributes to stability and to orderly continuity in 
the progression of the law. The common law of the Constitution, 
found in the accumulated crust of judicial interpretation, is a 
tough law. The force of prior decisions and the inherited tradi-
tion is such that the Court cannot lightly disregard precedent. The 
burden is upon the Court to demonstrate by a clear and convincing 
case that a change in constitutional interpretation is required, 
either to correct demonstrable error in earlier adjudications or to 
adapt interpretation to new circumstances. Even if these condi-
tions are satisfied, the Court must weigh the further question 
whether the benefits resulting from change outweigh the advan-
tages served by preserving the law's stability and whether the re-
sponsibility for change lies with the Court. But within these 
limits there is and should be room for change and growth in the 
law. The common law itself is not static. Even if it is a tough 
law, it is not stiff and immutable. Its vitality is attributable to its 
capacity for change and growth in response to new circumstances. 
Indeed, as Professor Cooperrider pointed out in his lecture, a gen-
eral relaxation of the stare decisis doctrine is apparent in the 
American judicial process. 
Mr. Justice Brandeis pointed out some years ago that the formal 
doctrine of stare decisis should not have the same relevancy in the 
area of constitutional interpretation as it has in other fields of the 
law.211 Judicial doctrines in the development of the common law 
21! See his dissenting opinion in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-
411 (1932). 
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or in the interpretation of statutes can be modified by legislative 
act if they appear to be erroneous or otherwise unsound. But 
correction of past interpretations of the Constitution, if now found 
to be clearly erroneous, or no longer applicable to changed condi-
tions, can be corrected only by the Court itself or by resort to the 
laborious process of constitutional amendment. Flexibility of in-
terpretation has itself been an important factor in preserving the 
vitality of our 173-year-old Constitution so that it has continued 
to serve many generations. 
In the reconsideration of prior decisions and previously estab-
lished principles, a distinction should be observed between the 
situation where the Court alone can correct what it may now re-
gard as erroneous or no longer applicable decisions and the situa-
tion where Congress is competent to take care of the matter. We 
may take as an illustration the case decided two years ago where the 
majority of the Court reaffirmed the power of the federal courts 
to punish summarily for contempt.26 This power has been exer-
cised since the very early days, subject only to limitations imposed 
by Congress in certain types of cases. Yet the dissenting Justices 
were ready to declare this time-honored practice unconstitutional. 
Here it seems is clearly a case where Congress is competent to cor-
rect an abuse of power, and where any fundamental change should 
be accomplished by legislation and not by judicial decision. 
Apart from the limitations inherent in the operations of a tri-
bunal that derives its inspiration from the judicial process of the 
common law, the Supreme Court has formulated for its own 
guidance a series of self-imposed limitations designed to assure self-
restraint and a sense of responsibility in the exercise of its impor-
tant powers. It will not deal prematurely with constitutional ques-
tions, it will interpret statutes if possible to avoid constitutional 
issues, it will insist that only parties with proper interests at stake 
in the litigation be allowed to raise constitutional questions, it will 
presume the validity of legislation, and it will accord a high meas-
ure of respect to the legislative determination. The validity and 
significance of some of these self-imposed limitations have come to 
the fore in contemporary developments within the Supreme Court. 
In the light of the basic philosophy of self-restraint underlying 
these limitations, it becomes pertinent to inquire how vigorously, 
if not even aggressively, members of the Court should emphasize 
the values they deem essential to our constitutional order. Ad-
20 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958). 
1961] THE SUPREME COURT AND THE RULE OF LAW 545 
mittedly much of the language of the Constitution admits of wide 
and varying constructions. The words drawn from · the four 
corners of the document furnish no automatic answer. Complete 
objectivity in the construction of the written document is not 
possible. The prepossessions and predilections of the judges and 
their policy preferences do shape the decisional process. The vigor 
and enthusiasm with which a judge emphasizes and elevates a 
given constitutional value embodied in the Constitution will de-
pend entirely on him. 
The problem is illustrated by the continuing controversy with-
in the Supreme Court on the interpretation of the first amend-
ment's freedoms. Conceding their importance, should they be 
construed in an absolute way or should account be taken of ap-
propriate public interests that may be protected by Congress even 
at the expense of limiting these rights to some extent. The group 
of so-called "activists" on the bench, headed by Justices Black and 
Douglas,27 give these rights an absolute construction, and hence 
deny the Court's authority to consider and weigh counter-balancing 
public interests that may be asserted to justify restrictions on these 
rights. A majority of the bench hold that the first amendment 
rights are not absolute, that they may be limited by Congress if 
if there is a rational ground in terms of public interest to justify the 
restriction, and that the Court's function is to balance the interests 
protected by the free speech guarantee against the competing 
public interest. Indeed, Mr. Justice Frankfurter has no use for the 
idea that the usual presumption of validity of legislation is to be 
discarded when first amendment freedoms are involved.28 Simi-
larly, in the construction of procedural rights, there is the division 
within the Court between those who would give these rights the 
widest possible construction and the others who would temper 
them with greater regard for the considerations of public safety in 
the effective enforcement of the criminal laws as well as for the 
principle of federalism where state prosecutions are involved. The 
question is not whether the Court should be hard or soft on Com-
munists or on criminals or whether the Court is sympathetic with 
or hostile to the policies underlying the challenged legislation. 
27 See Justice Black's dissenting opinion in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 
l!l!9 U.S. 382 (1950); dissenting opinions of Justices Black and Douglas in Dennis v. United 
States, 841 U.S. 494 (1951); Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Barenblatt v. United States, 
l!60 U.S. 109 (1959). See also Justice Black's address, The Bill of Rights, published in 35 
N.Y.U. L. R.EV. 865 (1960). 
28 See his separate opinion in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
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The question is one of the Court's proper role in the exercise of 
the power of judicial review. It appears to me, in light of our 
constitutional history, that the Court best discharges its position, 
always a delicate one, when it adheres to the limitations it has 
over the years imposed on itself and attempts the kind of judicial 
disinterestedness that is evident in the process that identifies, 
appraises and weighs all the interests at stake in the cases that 
come before it. But preference for a pragmatic balance-of-in-
terest approach, as opposed to absolutism, in the interpretation 
and enforcement of constitutional rights can be supported only if 
the competing interests are adequately identified and weighed by 
the Court. This process makes a heavy demand upon judgment. 
Without such careful inquiry, the principle of respect for the 
legislative determination and the balancing-of-interest technique 
furnish ready avenues for the facile rationalization of governmental 
power at the expense of constitutionally-protected rights. 
Respect for the Rule of Law as a restraint upon its own powers 
requires of the Court that its decisions be rendered on the basis of 
adequate and full consideration. At first blush it may appear that 
emphasis upon this point is wholly gratuitous. Certainly the 
Court's operations as a whole furnish no basis for any general 
criticism that it decides cases without the benefit of adequate de-
liberation. Indeed, the Court's history has demonstrated an over-
all high level of performance. For this very reason some aspects 
of the Court's recent work invite special consideration. 
Attention may be called to some instances of hasty or ill-consid-
ered decisions. Perhaps the most dramatic illustration is the 
Court's extraordinary behavior in the cases dealing with military 
trials of civilians abroad. When the Covert and Krueger cases 
were first decided, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Clark, 
held that the legislation authorizing these trials was constitu-
tional.29 Three Justices dissented, and Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
significantly deferred opinion because he had not had time to 
consider the case thoroughly. At the following term, these cases 
were restored to the docket, and this time a majority held that mili-
tary trial in this kind of case was unconstitutional.30 Mr. Justice 
Clark, joined by Mr. Justice Burton, dissented. To climax this 
story, the Court in a series of cases decided this term31 further 
extended the principle of the earlier holding, and Mr. Justice Clark 
29 351 U.S. 470 (1956). 
80 354 U.S. l (1957). 
81 See the later cases cited in note IO supra. 
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·wrote the opinion. Let it be said to Mr. Justice Clark's credit, 
however, that after his original views had been rejected by the 
majority, he did not persist in dissent in the face of the established 
law to the contrary. 
It seems clear that the Court did not take enough time for 
deliberation and decision when it handed down its first decision 
in the military trial cases. But the more disturbing kind of case 
indicating lack of thorough consideration arises when the Court 
within a short time after dealing with a problem feels obliged after 
further deliberation and consideration to overrule or sharply limit 
what was said in its first opinion. The released-time cases furnish 
a good illustration. In the McCollum case32 the Court held, with 
only one Justice dissenting, that a school board's program of re-
leased time for religious instruction was invalid. Yet only four 
years later in the Zorach case,33 a majority of the Court upheld a 
released-time program and distinguished McCollum on a ground 
which Mr. Justice Jackson in dissent called trivial and cynical. 
More importantly, the majority opinion in Zorach proceeded on 
premises radically different from those on which McCollum was 
based and more in accord with Mr. Justice Reed's dissent in the 
latter case. It is apparent that some of the Justices who concurred 
sub silentio in Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the majority in 
McCollum did not give thorough consideration either to the im-
plications of the majority opinion or to the considerations ex-
pressed in the dissenting opinion. 
Finally, a word should be said of the Court's responsibility for 
formulating meaningful and coherent principles of constitutional 
interpretation. There is a school of thought which belittles the 
significance of general principles and concepts and regards them 
only as symbols or tools of the trade to support a decision resting 
on the judge's reaction to the case and the facts before him. The 
role of the Supreme Court, however, in guiding the federal and 
state courts and in educating the American public on the meaning 
of the Constitution requires that the Court ground its decisions on 
reasoned argument and formulate rational and coherent principles 
that serve to illuminate and give guidance as well as to keep the 
Court itself within the bounds of law. The Court's contemporary 
work too often fails to illuminate and on the contrary leads to 
confusion and obfuscation. I may take as a prime example the 
32 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
sszorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
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cases dealing with the question whether a public employee may 
be dismissed because of invoking the fifth amendment before an 
investigating committee. The Slochower case said no.84 But later 
decisions culminating in the Globe case85 decided this spring say 
yes. The distinction made by the Court between the two cases 
seems wholly formal and verbal and hardly suggests a substantial 
underlying principle. 
A curious evasion of principle was manifest in one of the recent 
decisions upholding a state power to tax property owned by the 
United States and used by private persons. In order to sustain 
this taxation in the Murray Corporation case86 the Court in its 
majority opinion held that even though under Michigan law the 
tax was a property tax which according to familiar principles could 
not be imposed on property to which the United States held title, 
still the Court, in the face of the local characterization, would treat 
it as a use tax in order to sustain its validity. The old principle is 
observed but devitalized by this kind of reasoning. 
Mention may also be made at this point of the uncertainty and 
confusion engendered by the Court's decisions on the relationship 
between the first amendment and the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. According to the classic line of interpre-
tation the freedoms recognized in the first amendment are re-
garded as fundamental freedoms protected by the fourteenth 
amendment. But does this mean that the first amendment is 
literally incorporated in the fourteenth amendment? The distinc-
tion is important since it goes to the question whether these free-
doms have the significance accorded first amendment freedoms or 
whether as far as state action is concerned they are subject to rea-
sonable restraints in the exercise of the police power according to 
familiar due process conceptions. Yet the Court's opinions show 
uncertainty and lack of consistency on this important question.87 
84 Slochower v. Board of Higher Education of New York City, 350 U.S. 551 (1956). 
85 Globe v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960). 
86 City of Detroit v. Murray Corp. of America, 355 U.S. 489 (1958). 
87 Mr. Justice Douglas in his opinion in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 530 (1958), 
cites a number of cases to support his proposition that the first amendment "is applicable 
in all its particulars to the States." Cf. the view expressed in Mr. Justice Jackson's dissenting 
opinion in Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), and in Mr. Justice Harlan's dis-
senting opinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and in his separate opinion 
in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1960), that a distinction should be observed between 
freedom of the press protected under the first amendment and freedom of the press as a 
-fundamental right protected under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
At the least it must be said that the question admits of more doubt and uncertainty than 
Mr. Justice Brennan recognizes in his opinion in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 
(1960). 
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At times, depending on who writes the opinion, the Court speaks 
as if the first amendment is directly applicable to the states. At 
other times it speaks only of due process considerations.38 The 
question will continue to be a source of confusion unless and until 
the Court commits itself to some coherent theory of interpretation. 
I call your attention also to the recent tendency to use with in-
creasing frequency the summary per curiam opinion as a substitute 
for reasoned opinion. In some instances it is employed as a means 
of implied restatement of the rationale underlying a prior decision. 
It will be remembered that the famous school desegregation deci-
sion39 rested squarely and peculiarly on the finding that segrega-
tion in public schools resulted in harmful, discriminatory effects 
on Negro children. Yet in view of a series of later per curiam de-
cisions, 40 it must now be inferred that the school desegregation 
decision really was grounded on a broader principle, namely, that 
all segregation legislation is invalid since it rests on an imper-
missible basis of classification. 
But the per curiam opinion is also used as a means of deciding 
cases without the necessity of formulating an underlying principle, 
as illustrated by the movie censorship cases. In its opinion in the 
Burstyn case41 where the Court first held a movie censorship 
board's determination invalid, stress was placed on the idea that 
the term "sacrilegious" was too broad to serve as a standard under 
a system of control that operated as a previous restraint on freedom 
of expression. Then, however, by a series of per curiam decisions42 
which dealt with different statutory standards, the Court, citing 
Burstyn, extended the holding in this case in such a way as to 
leave any controlling principle clothed in obscurity. Did the 
later per curiam decisions mean that all movie censorship was 
invalid, or that the varying standards used were all equally 
objectionable as being too broad, or did they mean that the 
Court thought that it was an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise 
of administrative power to bar the showing of these particular 
38 Compare, for instance, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), with Beau-
harnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). And for cases decided during the current term, 
compare Talley v. California, 362 U.S. (1960), with Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 
U.S. 516 (1960). 
89 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
40 See the cases cited in note 20 supra. 
41 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
42 Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952); Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educa-
tion of State, Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of University of State of New York, 
346 U.S. 587 (1954); Holmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (1955); Times Film 
Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957). 
550 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 59 
films, and, in the latter event, was the Court undertaking to review 
each film on its merits? The several opinions in the later Kingsley 
International Pictures Corporation case43 did finally contribute to 
shed some light on these questions, although the division of think-
ing within the Court still leaves much in doubt. Admittedly the 
summary decision process serves an advantageous purpose for the 
Court when its members cannot agree on the reasons for the de-
cision, but it is not a satisfactory method for developing and extend-
ing new principles of constitutional interpretation.44 
The problem of distilling meaningful principles of interpreta-
tion from the Court's opinions becomes complicated and is made 
more difficult by the multiplicity of opinions and the fragmenta-
tion of the Court on important issues.45 There can be no quarrel 
with dissenting opinions and the freedom of the judges to ·write 
them. Dissenting opinions have played their part in the further 
development of the law. Similarly, the practice of ·writing separate 
concurring opinions is not in itself objectionable. But the ques-
tion may well be raised whether the practice of ·writing separate 
opinions has not in recent years reached undue proportions and 
impaired the effectiveness of the Court's work and weakened its 
position in the eyes of the public. It is not simply that the frag-
mentation of views finding expression in a spate of separate 
opinions often makes difficult, if not impossible, the task of dis-
tilling any meaningful controlling principle from the case, even 
though this is in itself an important consideration that should not 
be minimized. The more important question is whether the Court 
is discharging its responsibilities as a corporate tribunal that 
reaches judgment on the basis of a collective consideration that 
transcends individual views and preferences. In some instances 
multiple opinions reveal differences of approach and interpretation 
that might well have been ironed out, or at least clarified, had the 
judges more fully examined and analyzed the problems in the 
course of their own internal discussions. Perhaps the explanation 
here is that the Court is overworked and does not have sufficient 
time for its own internal deliberations.46 In justice to the Court, 
43 Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of the State of 
New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959). 
44 See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 
1, 20-23 (1959). 
45 See ZoBeII, Division. of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Dis-
integration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186 (1959). 
46 The point is developed at length by Professor Hart in his article, The Time Chcu-t 
of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84 (1959). 
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however, it must be recognized that its work by its very nature 
places extraordinary demands upon the time, energy and reflective 
processes of the judges in dealing with important and complex 
problems that encompass a wide range of subject matter. The 
Court does have a big job to do, and any counsel of perfectionism 
with respect to the way it should discharge its task is gratuitous. 
But it may well be that the Court is undertaking to review and 
decide too many cases at the expense of the time required for both 
collective and individual deliberation. The Court is master of its 
ovm house in respect to the number and kinds of cases it will hear. 
The problem, however, of division within the Court goes be-
yond the question of adequacy of corporate deliberation. The 
ultimate question is how far a judge is willing to subordinate his 
own views in the interests of a common collective judgment. This, 
too, is a problem of self-restraint, and in the end its resolution must 
rest on the conscience of the judge. Surely consideration must be 
given to the weakening consequences of divisiveness and, con-
versely, to the strength found in unity. The Court's unanimous 
decision in the school desegregation case will remain a classic 
example of the impressive weight and authority that attach to the 
Court's judgments when it speaks with a single voice.47 
In bringing this lecture to a close I should not conclude on a 
negative vote. Like any human institution the Supreme Court is 
subject to criticism, and in view of the important powers exercised 
by the Court - powers that vitally pertain to matters of great na-
tional concern- it is not only proper but wholesome and desirable 
that the Court's work be subject to public discussion and criticism. 
But criticism and expressions of dissatisfaction, whatever the occa-
sion and whatever the ends to which they are directed, should not 
obscure our awareness or appreciation of the extraordinary con-
tribution that the Supreme Court has made in vindicating the 
supremacy of the fundamental law as a limitation on governmental 
authority, in maintaining the vitality of the great symbols of our 
constitutional tradition, in protecting the rights of the individual, 
and in promoting freedom, equality, and justice under the law. 
We gratefully acknowledge this and also the integrity, high-mind-
edness and sense of dedication which the members of the Court 
have brought to their tasks and which have contributed so im-
47 It is worth noting in this connection that in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I (1958), 
the Court, in order to give the maximum weight to its decision, resorted to the extraor• 
dinary device of rendering an opinion of the Court signed by all nine Justices. 
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portantly to the reputation that the Court has established for itself 
as one of the world's great tribunals. In the adherence to the high 
standards and traditions maintained over the years of its long life 
lie the hope and promise of the Court's continued fulfillment of its 
pre-eminent role in vindicating the Rule of Law. 
